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INTRODUCTION
When the national government passes a law and state officials think
the feds have overstepped their bounds, everyone knows the script. We
all know it's a federalism problem, we all know the doctrinal tools the
states will deploy, and most of us are either rooting for Team State or
suiting up with the National[ists]. Most of us can even tell you why it's
a good thing that the states and federal government engage in turf wars
no matter which side we're on, and some of us even have a theory about
whether and when courts should referee these fights.
The states also intrude on each other's turf, but this script isn't nearly
as clear. We definitely have a name for these phenomena-spillovers-
and most people worry about them. We worry when lax gun-ownership
enforcement in Georgia increases the number of firearms in New York.1
We worry when California's emissions standards trump the standards of
every other state and the EPA.2 We worry when the Texas school board
moves its curriculum in a more conservative direction and brings the
entire textbook industry along with it to the dismay of school officials in
blue states.3 We once even worried when same-sex couples married in
one state moved to a state that didn't recognize such marriages.4
These controversies don't just generate handwringing; they generate
legal fees. In the last year alone, we've seen federal lawsuits designed
to put a stop to spillovers stemming from Colorado's legalization of
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1. New York City, concemed that lax enforcement outside of New York was creating a market
in which illegal guns were flooding the city, conducted a sting operation in Georgia and elsewhere and
then filed suit against gun dealers in those states. See Amended Complaint, City of New York v. A-1
Jewelry & Pawn, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2007) (No. 06 CV 2233), 2007 WL 2739888.
2. E.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155-57 (E.D.
Cal. 2007), affd on reh"g, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300-03 (D. Vt. 2007).
3. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE LANGUAGE POLICE 71-72, 98-107 (2003).
4. E.g., Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J., concurring).
Happily, this case can now be followed by a "but see." But see Obergefell v. Hodges, 136 S. Ct. 2071
(2015).
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marijuana,5 Vermont's regulation of food labels,6 Minnesota's ban on
purchasing electricity from coal-fired plants,7 and California's efforts to
regulate the treatment of animals by the food industry.8 All of these
activities have affected people in other states, and all have kicked up
interstate brouhahas.
For some of these disputes, you may be able to identify a ready frame
for resolving them-due process, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
Dormant Commerce Clause. For others, you may not be able to identify
an obvious means to do so. You may not even have a fully formed view
on how these disputes ought to be resolved, save the vague sense that
spillovers are bad. It's unsettling, after all, when one state's policies
stretch beyond its territories. It's unsettling for the simplest of reasons:
no one wants to live under someone lse's law.
What I just described is pretty much how the two halves of "Our
Federalism" look in terms of doctrine and theory. Federalism is
commonly thought to be a single field of study, but in fact it is two; it
encompasses not just relations between the states and the federal
government, but among the states. Vertical federalism is so familiar that
we can recite the reasons to value states' role in our federal system as
easily as children recite the alphabet. The law of horizontal federalism,
in contrast, has mostly developed within its doctrinal silos-the
Dormant Commerce Clause, personal jurisdiction, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. That's not necessarily a bad thing. Horizontal
federalism's problem-centered approach allows for adaptation and
attention to context. But even though these doctrinal silos are setting the
terms on which states interact, we've done relatively little to theorize the
ways states ought to interact across doctrinal domains.
In this lecture, I will make two points. First, it's both strange and
instructive that the two halves of "Our Federalism" have developed so
differently given that they are both preoccupied with the same problem:
what happens when one government invades another's turf? Vertical
federalism offers a single narrative for adjudicating federal-state
relations. It asks the same question in every case-how should we think
of federal-state relations writ large?-and unsurprisingly gets the same
answer in virtually every case from scholars and judges alike.
5. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support, States of
Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado, 2014 WL 7474136 (U.S.); Plaintiffs' Complaint For
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Smith et al. v. Hickenlooper, Civ. Action No. 15-462, (D. Colo. Mar.
5, 2015), //jurist.org/paperchase/uploads/Smith_vHickenlooper Complaint.pdf.
6. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV- 117, 2015 WL 1931142 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015).
7. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014).
8. Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013)
("Harris I"); Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et D'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) ("Harris Ir') (on remand); Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
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Horizontal federalism, meanwhile, resolves state-federal tussles issue by
issue, problem by problem, domain by domain. Rather than focusing on
a single big question-how should we think of state-state relations writ
large?-it emphasizes context and facts on the ground and a myriad of
doctrinal questions writ small.
While there are certainly benefits to horizontal federalism's seriatim
approach, it's missing what vertical federalism theory has long
provided: a broad-gauged account of how our governing institutions
ought to interact. Only with such an account can courts sensibly referee
the conflicts that arise between states, let alone decide which conflicts to
adjudicate in the first place.
Second, if we're going to build an overarching narrative for
horizontal federalism, it shouldn't be the story scholars have offered
thus far. The moral of that story is that no one should be forced to live
under someone else's law. But that tale is premised on an outdated
attachment to state sovereignty and an unrealistic impulse to tamp down
on state spillovers.
It takes a theory to beat a theory, of course, and any effort to build an
alternative account of interstate relations must squarely address the
powerful intuition that fuels the current debate-that it is illegitimate
when one is forced to live under someone else's law. I hope to offer the
beginnings of a counternarrative not by denying the well-known costs
associated with spillovers,9 but by showing that our intuitions capture
only half the story. Democracy is surely about self-rule. But it's also
about ruling together. And in an age like ours-one in which we've
sorted ourselves into all-too-comfortable red and blue enclaves-
spillovers are an important mechanism for fostering a well-functioning
democracy.
Part I will argue that although vertical and horizontal federalism
address what is, at the root, the same problem, the two fields have
traveled quite different doctrinal paths. Vertical federalism offers a one-
size-fits-all framework for adjudicating federal-state relations, whereas
the analysis in horizontal federalism cases tends to be highly contextual
and quite variegated. After identifying the costs and benefits of these
two approaches, this Part will make the case for creating an overarching
account of interstate relations to match the narrative that vertical
federalism supplies. Part II will criticize scholars' initial efforts to build
an overarching tale of horizontal federalism and sketch an alternative,
democratically inflected account that we should deploy going forward.
9. For a survey of those well-trod arguments, see Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The
Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REv. 57, 69-78 (2014).
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I. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: A TALE OF Two FIELDS
If you were to read the U.S Reports, you'd probably miss the fact that
"Our Federalism" encompasses relations among the states as well as
relations between the states and federal government. Vertical federalism
is federalism as far as most people are concerned. Many have never
even heard of horizontal federalism, let alone imagined it as a field of
study.
As a result of this neglect, vertical federalism offers a fully developed
doctrinal tale, even an epic of its own. We know what's supposed to
happen when the states tussle with the federal government. The values
associated with vertical federalism are so familiar that they now
resemble a bedtime story for law students. Vertical federalism is
thought to promote choice, foster competition, facilitate participation,
enable experimentation, and ward off the national Leviathan. 
10
Horizontal federalism, in sharp contrast, resembles an anthology of
short stories. Although courts routinely referee disputes among states,
we don't have an overarching narrative of how interstate relations are
supposed to work. While some scholars have started to build one, as I'll
discuss in Part II, judges and scholars mostly approach these cases
seriatim.11 We tell one story about the Dormant Commerce Clause,
another about personal jurisdiction, still another about Full Faith and
Credit.
If the scholarly world is divided between lumpers and splitters-
between those who see connections across subject areas and those who
think context matters most-vertical federalism is the province of the
lumper. A single narrative shapes the doctrine in every domain.
Horizontal federalism, meanwhile, is the province of the splitter. It has
developed issue by issue, problem by problem, domain by domain, and
it lacks a unified narrative that cuts across issues, problems, and
10. For summaries of these arguments, see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59
(1991); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75-106 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views
of Federalism: "Converse-1983 " in Context, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1229 (1994); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest
A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 109-10 (2001);
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government ofLimited and Enumerated Powers ": In Defense of United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 774-79 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988); Ernest A. Young,
The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1, 53-63 (2004); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1484, 1493-1511 (1987) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)). For the case that we reel these
arguments off too easily, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317 (1997).
11. E.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 96 (2012); Allan Erbsen,
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 495 (2008); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and
Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on
Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 289, 326 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV,
and Interstate Relations, 120 HARv. L. REv. 1468, 1474 (2007).
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domains.
It's strange that these two halves of federalism have developed so
differently because they both address the same problem: the conflict
that arises when one government's policies intrude upon another's.
States, after all, tread on each other's policymaking turf just as often as
the states and federal governments regulate at cross-purposes. The
boundaries for these skirmishes are different, to be sure. We typically
mark state boundaries along territorial lines and federal boundaries
along subject matter lines. But at bottom they are just different kinds of
turf wars.
The natural question, of course, is which half of the field has it right?
Is it better to be a lumper or a splitter in studying "Our Federalism"?
Or, if you prefer Isaiah Berlin's formulation,12 is it better to be a
hedgehog or a fox, the creature that knows one big thing or the creature
that knows many small ones?
Vertical federalism is a field with one theory to rule them all. 13 That
single-minded focus has its pluses. This unified account lends order and
coherence to an otherwise motley range of doctrinal questions, from
preemption to the Spending Clause, from interstate commerce to
commandeering. It's an account that ensures that judges keep their eye
on the ball: maintaining the healthy state-federal interactions that
undergird our democracy. It's also a clear and comprehensible story,
one that makes intuitive sense and ensures a reasonable amount of
doctrinal consistency across cases. I should note that this praise
represents a begrudging admission on my part, as I think the narrative
that dominates vertical federalism is largely claptrap. But it's important
to give the devil its due. Sometimes, as I've written elsewhere,14 bad
theory makes for not-so-bad case law.
There are costs to the one-size-fits-all approach, however. To begin,
doctrine is not tailored to context. Commandeering doctrine is applied
when the federal government has roped in understaffed local sheriffs to
enforce gun laws15 and when the states themselves have called upon
Congress to help them deal with the shared problem of nuclear waste
disposal.16 Spending Clause doctrine applies both to a relatively trivial
case involving conditional highway funding17 and to one of the most
12. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY
(1953).
13. With apologies to Tolkien.
14. See Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 99-101
(2014).
15. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
17. See Dole v. South Dakota, 482 U.S. 203 (1987).
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important cooperative federal regimes of the 20th century. 
1 8
The Supreme Court also lacks much by way of a calibrating
mechanism. Because vertical federalism focuses on a single narrative,
the doctrine is built entirely around a judge's assessment of nation-state
relations writ large. Every time the Court renders a decision, it's
thinking about one big question-are the states weak or strong vis-d-vis
the federal government?-rather than the myriad of smaller questions
that might be relevant to the decision. New York v. United States19 is a
perfect example. You can imagine why a Court concerned about the
erosion of state power would announce an anti-commandeering rule.
But the case may have been a poor vehicle for adopting such a rule.
New York, after all, involved a scheme negotiated by the states
themselves. It was pushed by the National Governors' Association,2 °
which supplied much of the bill's language,21 and thirty-nine states
opted into interstate compacts that Congress ratified.22 Congress was
arguably serving as helpmate, not Leviathan.
23
Or think about the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court uses the
same test to evaluate a federal prohibition on the sale of medical
marijuana24 and the detention of a mentally ill federal prisoner.25  By
forcing such disparate problems into the same doctrinal framework, the
Court has moved from identifying a sensible connection between an
enumerated power and a subject area to detecting what Alison
18. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012)
19. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
20. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Subcomm.
on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Public Works on S. 1517 and S. 15 78, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 249-51 (1985) (statement of Gov. Booth Gardner, State of Washington).
21. Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Hearings on H.R. 862, H.R. 1046, HR. 1083, H.R. 1267, H.R.
2062, H.R. 2635, and H.R. 2702 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1985) (statement of Rep. John Dingell,
State of Michigan) ("I am encouraged by the progress which has been made under the auspices of the
National Governors' Association .... Flexibility and the spirit of compromise has characterized [these
negotiations] .... I understand that those States which do not now have disposal sites [are] willing to
support a legislative compromise which submits them to a tight new timetable with serious
consequences for failure to meet the milestones established.").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d) (Supp. 1 1985).
23. Or perhaps it wasn't. While state officials pushed for the regime as a whole, the "take title"
provision struck down in New York was enacted over state opposition and without much opportunity for
the states to negotiate. See Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in
the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 1 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 447
(1987); A. Marie Ashe, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act and the Tenth Amendment: A
Paragon of Legislative Success or a Failure ofAccountability, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 268, 285 (1993). The
point here isn't to resolve this question, but simply to point out that the New York majority paid no
attention to it.
24. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
25. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
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LaCroix astutely calls a "formalistic, quasi-jurisdictional nexus
between specific individuals and federal instrumentalities.26
The absence of a calibrating mechanism is also one of the reasons that
academics who write about vertical federalism divide into camps, with
nationalists favoring centralization in almost every case, and
federalism's stalwarts inevitably favoring devolution. As I've explained
elsewhere,27 it's odd that there are camps in federalism debates. After
all, there are many sensible justifications for moving decisions up or
down the governance hierarchy. You would expect that views on
devolution to be highly contextual and fall along a broad continuum.
What we see instead are firm commitments to a single institutional
design strategy across policymaking spheres.
Camps exist in part because vertical federalism is focused on a single
narrative. We ask the same question in every case, and it's not
surprising that we come out with the same answer. Every case, in effect,
asks us to evaluate the federal-state balance writ large. No wonder
federalism's stalwarts favor state power in almost every instance and
nationalists deploy a one-way ratchet of their own. It's as hard for
scholars to calibrate as it is for the Court.
The law of horizontal federalism has developed quite differently
precisely because it lacks one theory to rule them all. Without an
overarching narrative, the doctrine has developed in a problem-centered
fashion. As a result, the case law is quite diverse. Horizontal federalism
does not ask the same question in every case, and it's not surprising that
the courts and scholars have generated a far more wide-ranging set of
answers.
Certain kinds of state spillovers, for instance, fall into clear doctrinal
frameworks while others have been left to the political process to work
out.28 Even for those controversies the courts are willing to referee, the
doctrine is highly variegated. Due process cases look quite different
from Dormant Commerce Clause cases, which differ in turn from those
that fall under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. There isn't even
consistency within doctrinal domains. Personal jurisdiction questions,
for example, were once cast in the vernacular of federalism, with its talk
of territory and sovereigns.29 Now they are cast in terms of individual
rights.3 °
26. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article 1, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2077 (2014).
27. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Ditente?, 59 ST. LOUIS L. REV.
997, 999-1000 (2015).
28. For a survey of both types of cases, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 73-78, 105-19.
29. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For an analysis and evaluation
of this shift, see Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the
Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 75 (1984); Patrick J. Borchers & J. McIntyre
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Courts also enjoy more room to calibrate in horizontal federalism
cases. Some doctrinal silos, for instance, are more tolerant of interstate
spillovers than others. Personal jurisdiction is premised on the notion
that it's sometimes appropriate for one state to exert control over the
citizens of another. The BMW line of cases on punitive damages, also
rooted in due process, is more skeptical of such intrusions.31 Much of
the doctrine is designed to prevent spillovers, when state law reaches
outside its borders but shouldn't. But some doctrine (such as the Full
Faith and Credit Clause) addresses what I've termed spillunders, which
occur when a state's law should extend beyond its borders but doesn't.
32
If you are a splitter, you might well celebrate this approach. You
might think we shouldn't do what we do in vertical federalism-ask the
same question and get the same answer-for every interstate kerfuffie.
You might think that assessing the respect owed to the out-of-state
judgments is fundamentally different from policing the economic self-
dealing of state legislatures, which in turn differs from deciding whether
a citizen can be haled into another state's court.
Horizontal federalism has also done a better job of responding to the
doctrinal equivalent of a stress test: adjusting to the extraordinary level
of economic, democratic, and regulatory integration that emerged during
the 20th century. Until quite recently, judges and academics have clung
to a story about autonomous sovereigns in vertical federalism.33  I
suspect that's in part because they are assessing cases at such a high
level of generality, looking to state-federal relations writ large rather
than to the specifics of the regulatory regime in front of them. Had
Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245
(2011); Dan Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533
(1982); John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1050
(1983); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under
Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1984); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State
Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 699 (1983); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1113-14, 1117-20 (1981). For arguments that the
Court should pay more attention to the federalism dimensions of these cases, see Florey, supra note 59.
See also Erbsen, supra note 11; Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction
over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006); Stephen E. Sachs, How
Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. (2014); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CH. L. REV. 617 (2006); Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1987);
Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 5 (1989); Arthur M.
Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985). For signs
that at least some of the Justices are likely to be sympathetic to such an approach, see an opinion
recently penned by Justice Kennedy, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
31. For an overview, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 75-76.
32. Id. at 78-79, 118.
33. For an overview, see Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 11, 18 (2010).
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judges paid more attention to facts on the ground, they would have
realized that the tale of autonomous sovereigns i hard to square with
today's realities, where the states and federal governments govern
shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space.
34
To be sure, the stubborn facts of modernization have not gone
unnoticed in federalism debates, and sovereignty has been declared
"dead" so many times that one starts to believe in the doctrinal version
of reincarnation.35 But the scholarly reaction to this shift has been either
to move to the nationalist camp, all but erasing the states from
constitutional discourse, or to pivot from a sovereignty account of state
power to an autonomy account. Both reveal the persistence of the old,
sovereignty story.36 The nationalist move simply endorses a sovereignty
account of a different sort, one in which the national sovereign trumps
the state sovereign.37 And while most of federalism's stalwarts have
abandoned sovereignty for autonomy in describing the power of the
state, the two are little different from one another.38 An autonomy
account is softer around the edges and does not demand formal judicial
protections, so it's more palatable to academics who fancy themselves
au courant. Deep down, however, both a sovereignty account and an
autonomy account rest on the same basic conception of state power, one
in which states preside over their own empire and regulate free from
federal interference. That means that both the sovereignty and
autonomy account depend on open regulatory space for the states to
govern freely. The trouble is that there's not much of it left anymore.
That's why the sovereignty/autonomy debate is becoming increasingly
irrelevant to facts on the ground even as it retains its hold on the
imaginations of judges and commentators alike.
Because horizontal federalism lacks an uber-narrative directing
judges' attention to interstate relations writ large, courts have done a
better job of adapting to the reality of integration and overlap in at least
some parts of the field. At the very least, judges and scholars have
noticed how interstate relations actually function on the ground. As a
result, we see more engagement with the realities of regulatory
spillovers and concurrent jurisdiction.
34. For a survey of the scholarship making this point, see Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the
New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1913-15 (2014).
35. The tradition dates back at least to Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
36. For an analysis, see Gerken, supra note 33, at 11-17 (discussing the deep continuities
between autonomy and sovereignty); id. at 71-73 (noting the strong ties between sovereignty and a
traditional nationalist account).
37. Gerken, supra note 33, at 71-73 (noting the strong ties between sovereignty and a traditional
nationalist account).
38. Id. at 11-17 (discussing the deep continuities between autonomy and sovereignty).
2016]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
Personal jurisdiction, for instance, is premised on the notion that one
state may reach out and regulate--even hale into court-the citizens of
another. Although these cases plainly implicate horizontal federalism
and state sovereignty39-they were once explicitly linked to such
concerns4 0 -the Court has recast them in the language of individual
rights. Prior to 1945, the Court clung to the idea that, to quote Pennoyer
v. Neff, "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory., 41  This sovereignty-based
approach forced courts o devise one formalist workaround after another
to deal with the realities of interstate travel and interstate commerce.42
Eventually, however, the courts' sovereignty framework shattered under
the pressures created by an integrated national economy.43 The Court
finally began asking itself the right question: how to deal with the
problem of regulatory overlap.
The Supreme Court famously answered that question in International
Shoe,44 where it turned to due process as the touchstone for jurisdiction
fights and offered a more realistic approach to the problems of
concurrence. Judges no longer defined state power solely as the ability
to shield its residents from the influence of other states (the spillover
problem). Instead, the Court acknowledged that state power sometimes
includes the ability to extend its reach outside its territory (the spillunder
problem). That shift allowed the courts to move away from an
unproductive frame, one that imagined a state exercising exclusive
control within, and only within, its territory. It thus prodded judges to
think about the right question: under what circumstances should a state's
power reach beyond its borders?
We see the same adaptation occurring in the context of the Full Faith
39. Even setting aside the most obvious vestiges of a sovereignty approach, e.g., Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion), worries about spillovers, sovereignty, and
horizontal relations often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) inform the Court's assessment of what
process is owed a citizen who is subject to the jurisdiction or laws of another state. See, e.g., World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
40. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
41. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
42. The history is familiar to all. For early accounts, see Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1146-47 (1966)
(explaining how the "growing mobility and complexity of modem life" lies behind jurisdictional
developments in the field); Bernard Auerbach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. REV.
13, 14 (1966). For specific examples of these efforts, see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1065, 1066 (3d ed. 2013).
43. For a seminal critique of Pennoyer's underpinnings, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241, 262-72. For the funniest summary of the
canonical story and an effort to complicate and undermine it, see Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale
of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 258 (1990) ("Many years ago (in 1877, to be exact)
there came into the realm of American jurisprudence an evil dragon known as Pennoyer v. Neff . .
44. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
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and Credit Clause. That may be due in part to the text of the Clause,
which can be read as a textual sanction of state policies moving beyond
their borders because it requires states to enforce the judgments of other
states.45 Presumably as a result, some-but decidedly not all-of the
doctrine and scholarship to emerge from the Full Faith and Credit
Clause helps us think about the problem of spillovers, spillunders, and
regulatory overlap. Consider, for instance, the scholarly work on the
recognition of same-sex marriage before the Court resolved this issue
for the nation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Academics who wrote on the
subject often eschewed the notion that the only form of state power that
matters is a state's ability to shield its citizens from out-of-state policies.
They recognized that state power also encompasses the ability to extend
state policies beyond its bounds.46
One might even be able to say something similar about the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Here again, the courts sometimes ask the right
question. Rather than deny the reality of spillovers, judges are asking
which spillovers should be shut down and which should be allowed to
run their course. Notions of "discriminatory" and "nondiscriminatory"
state regulations offer at least a rudimentary vocabulary for determining
which spillovers require court intervention and which can be left to what
I've called "the political safeguards of horizontal federalism.'A7
You can see, then, the relative costs and benefits to the lumper and
splitter approaches. Vertical federalism is the province of the lumper.
Its unifying narrative lends coherence to a disparate range of cases.
Built up over time, it fits well with judicial intuitions, does a fairly good
job of cabining judicial discretion, and has real staying power.
Vertical federalism's strengths, however, are the flip side of its
weakness. The power of its narrative has held the courts steady, lending
shape and consistency to the doctrine. The judges ask themselves the
same question in every case-how strong are the states vis-d-vis the
federal government?-and unsurprisingly come up with a consistent
answer. But vertical federalism's doctrinal toolbox contains mostly one-
way ratchets-arguments that consistently favor lodging power with
either the national government or the states-rather than tools capable of
calibrating the doctrine to varied institutional settings. The narrative
also directs our focus to a high level of generality-federal-state
relations writ large-and draws our attention from the facts on the
ground, facts which should prod courts to deal with the reality of
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.").
46. For an overview of this work, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 117-18.
47. For an overview, see id. at 114.
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integration and regulatory overlap. Put simply, by focusing on the one
big question-how the states and federal government should interact-
vertical federalism has failed to answer many of the small ones.
Still, the splitters can't just claim victory and leave the field. To be
sure, horizontal federalism's doctrine is better calibrated to its doctrinal
silos and the reality of regulatory overlap. But the cases are so
variegated that you might forget they all descend from the same stock.
The field's doctrinal silos have generated radically different answers to
what is, at bottom, the same question-how should the states interact
with one another?48 We even see inconsistency within doctrinal silos.
Witness, for instance, the massive doctrinal switch that occurred in the
context of personal jurisdiction.49 Or confine yourself to a single
constitutional clause and think about how differently due process treats
spillovers in the context of punitive damages, on the one hand, and
personal jurisdiction, on the other.50
Inconsistency isn't horizontal federalism's only problem. These
cases are ultimately dictating the terms on which the states interact, and
yet courts lack a cohesive account of how states ought to interact.
Surely there's some space between what we see in vertical federalism-
which focuses exclusively on the same big question-and not asking the
big question at all. Indeed, in some instances (like personal jurisdiction)
interstate relations have faded so far into the background that some have
called for a return to basic federalism tenets, returning personal
jurisdiction to its territorial and sovereignty-based roots.51 Whatever
you think of that move, it is animated by a desire to focus on the big
question at stake in all horizontal federalism cases. Adapting a broad
principle to a doctrinal domain makes perfect sense, but one needs a
broad principle in the first place.
To be fair, inconsistency wouldn't be a problem if these questions
bore no relation to one another. But the Constitution is designed to
preserve a well-functioning federal system. That includes not just
healthy relations between the states and federal government, but among
the states themselves.5 2 We need an account of how a well-functioning
system is supposed to work. Vertical federalism may be fairly criticized
for missing the trees for the forest, but horizontal federalism deserves
the more traditional variant of the rebuke.
48. Supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
49. Supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
50. Supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
51. Erbsen, supra note 11; Parrish, supra note 30.
52. That's one of the main purposes of Article IV and some parts of Article I.
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II. TOWARD AN OVERARCHING NARRATIVE
In recent years, a handful of scholars have noticed the absence of a
guiding narrative in horizontal federalism and tried to develop a
transsubstantive account of interstate relations to match the one
routinely deployed in vertical federalism.
53
These scholars are right to think that we need a story to tell about
interstate relations. They've just been telling the wrong story. Most-
but decidedly not a1154 -of the scholars who have tried to craft a new
narrative aim to tamp down on the spillovers that naturally emerge from
our highly integrated system. The storyline scholars are pushing, in
other words, is that no one should live under someone else's law.
This emerging account is deeply rooted in the notion of sovereignty."
Just as the sovereignty types once tried to confine states and the federal
government to their own regulatory spheres, scholars of horizontal
federalism want to confine states to their own territorial spheres.56 Doug
Laycock makes this connection explicit. Just as the Framers allocated
authority between the states and federal government based on subject
matter, he writes, they allocated authority among the states based on
territory, which plays a crucial role in defining states' "semi-sovereign"
status. 57 Much of the work is thus premised on the assumption that it's
possible to cut back on regulatory overlap and confine states' reach to
53. Two of the early movers on this front were Gillian Metzger and Allan Erbsen, and both
accounts continue to dominate the field. See Erbsen, supra note 11; Metzger, supra note 11. Erbsen has
even taken the next step, deploying what he takes to be the general mandates of horizontal federalism
and applying them to one of the field's doctrinal silos. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60
EMORY L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing how horizontal federalism principles might affect personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence). While Erbsen and Metzger ignited this debate, one should acknowledge the early work
of Doug Laycock, which invoked the notion of territoriality in building an account of interstate relations
that transcended horizontal federalism's doctrinal silos, as well as the work of Judith Resnik, which has
focused on federalism's horizontal and even its "diagonal" dimensions. See Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 249 (1992); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the
2005 Class Action Fairness Act: "The Political Safeguards" of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1929 (2008); Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism,
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709
(2008); Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L.
REV. 1105 (2008); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 44 (2007)
(noting that "[h]orizontal federalism ... is coming into view as a subject for the legal academy..." and
offering one of the early contributions to trend); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1581
(2006).
54. The work of Gillian Metzger and Mark Rosen, in particular, stand as exceptions to this rule.
Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 108-10 (situating their work in the field).
55. For a full exploration, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 71-73, 91-95.
56. For an overview, see id. at 101.
57. Laycock, supra note 53, at 296-97.
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their own territories, all with an aim to ensure that the policies of one
state don't affect the citizens of another's.
This turn to sovereignty might be quite surprising given that vertical
federalism scholars (but not the courts) typically treat sovereignty talk as
a quaint relic of the past. As I noted above, while vertical scholars
have clung to what is in essence a sovereignty-like view of state power,
they understand themselves to have interred sovereignty decades ago.
It's a bit startling, then, to read an account of horizontal federalism that
is unabashedly sovereigntist in orientation.
There is, however, a deep connection between a distaste for
spillovers-a concern with the costs associated with living under
someone else's laws-and a sovereignty account. Indeed, sovereignty
stands in for a larger set of concerns about equality among the states,
territoriality, and self-rule,59 each of which offers a deeply intuitive
58. Supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
59. These principles amount to something of a mantra in the horizontal federalism literature and
are regularly invoked, separately and together, in much of the work on the subject even by those who
don't use the term sovereignty. See Ann O'M. Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate
Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 535 (2004) (discussing sovereignty and equality);
Erbsen, supra note 11, at 507-10, 514-16, 527-28 (discussing all four concerns); Patrick M. Garry et
al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-State Political Contributions May Affect a Small State's
Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV.
35, 40 (2010) ("[H]orizontal federalism reflects the view that each state must have a sufficient degree of
independent and autonomy for other states."); Michael S. Greve, Choice and the Constitution, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (2003), http://www.aei.org/outlook/politics-and-public-opinion/judicial/choice-and-
the-constitution/ (describing the fundamental principles guiding horizontal federalism: state equality,
democratic self-rule, and "a presumption that state sovereignty must end at the borders"); David V.
Snyder, Molecular Federalism and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 ND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STuD. 419, 432 (2007) (arguing that spillovers "[i]n democratic terms... reflect[] a lack of
representation"); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territoriality, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2009)
(offering a comprehensive take on extraterritoriality); see also Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 99-
104 (collecting sources). We see a similar tendency among scholars who write within the doctrinal silos
that fall within the ambit of horizontal federalism. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of
Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 292-99 (1999)
(calling for sovereignty-based, territorial limitations on punitive damages awards); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A
Historical Reassessment ofFull Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485 (2013) (offering a
historical account of the Full Faith and Credit Clause which would place "territorial-based" limits on the
ability of Congress to give a state's law extraterritorial effect); Laycock, supra note 53, at 315-21
(arguing that states are not sovereign in the sense that countries are sovereignty but relying on notions of
state equality and territoriality to define state's "semi-sovereign" status to understand choice-of-law
issues); Laylock, supra note 53, at 250-52 (looking to territoriality and state equality as principles for
defining the limits of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive
Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (2006)
("the sovereign authority of states does not properly extend to the punishment of lawful extraterritorial
activity within the federal system"); Michael Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 71 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93,
95-100 (2002) (arguing that our current torts regime, with its generous choice of law rules, undermines
horizontal federalism and violates the "principles of state autonomy and equality," which require that
"each state govern its own territory and citizens but not, of course, the territory and citizens of other
states"); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment ofFull Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON L.
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frame for anyone worried about living under someone else's law.
Sovereignty and self-rule are natural intellectual traveling
companions if you are concerned with the problem of living under
someone else's law. One of the reasons we are uncomfortable with
spillovers is that they deprive people of the chance to exercise control
over their own destinies. They allow representatives of one state's
citizens to tell another's what to do.60 On this view, being forced to live
under someone else's law seems profoundly antidemocratic.
So, too, a preoccupation with territoriality is completely
understandable if one worries about the costs associated with living
under someone else's law. The most obvious way to bound a state's
laws, after all, is to insist that they stay within a state's territorial
bounds.
Even the notion that the states must be treated as coequal makes ense
in this larger narrative. If you are worried about he citizens of one state
living under someone else's laws, the states you'll worry most about are
the big, populous states. In large part due to their market power,
populous states setting policies for themselves often end up setting
policy for others. California is the prime example. During the last few
years, it has managed to annoy just about everyone at some point or
another by passing laws that spill over into other states.61
As must be clear from the first half of this essay, I'm all for
developing an overarching narrative in horizontal federalism. But I'd
hate to see us make the same mistake in horizontal federalism that we
have in vertical federalism and anchor ourselves to the wrong story.
The sovereignty model has lots of attractions for anyone worried about
living under someone else's law. But its factual underpinnings are too
unstable to support the doctrinal edifice it's designed to support. As a
formal matter, the states aresovereign, they are equal, and they can only
control those within their own territories. As a realistic matter,
sovereignty is no more to be had in the horizontal realm than it is in the
vertical one, equality is myth, and spillovers occur all the time.
To be sure, policymaking would certainly be simpler if states'
REV. 485, 489 (2013) (looking to principles of "territorial-based jurisdictional principles" to cabin
Congress' power to give state laws extraterritorial effect and relying on the courts to protect state
sovereignty).
60. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003); Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987); Cordray, supra note 59, at 308 (expressing concern when a state
"projects its own regulatory choices ... onto other states" and thereby "infring[es] the policy choice of
other States") (quoting BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572) (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Florey, supra note 59, at 1115 (one of the "ideological principles of federalism" is that "states are
entitled to some autonomous sphere in which to make policy free of interference from other
sovereigns").
61. See Heather K. Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else's Law, 36 DEM. J.
42 (2015).
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policies never crossed territorial lines-if no one ever had to live under
someone else's laws. But in a highly interconnected, tightly networked
system like our own, states inevitably affect one another, and spillovers
are pervasive. Regulatory overlap is a stubborn fact in both the
horizontal and vertical realm.62 None of this is to deny that sovereignty
captures important intuitions about the appropriate limits of state power.
But the fact that something is intuitive or even important doesn't make it
true.
The sovereignty narrative in horizontal federalism is also premised on
the idea that the states are equal to one another, thus rendering it vaguely
offensive when large states' policies influence small ones. Here again,
the formal truth is belied by informal realities. Just as there are
"superstatutes"63  and "superprecedents,64  there are what I call
"superstates.65 Populous states like California and Texas can affect the
policies of other states in a way that Rhode Island and Montana cannot.
We could try to change the existing state of affairs. But, as with
vertical federalism, the price for maintaining clean jurisdictional lines
and limited policymaking domains is too steep. We'd have to give up on
an integrated market. We'd have to give up on a national democracy.
We might even have to stop our citizens from crossing state lines.
While self-rule sounds like a trump card in the abstract, when we
recognize the normative goods we'd have to sacrifice to attain it, the
trade-off is less appealing.
I'm not just worried that the emerging narrative is unrealistic,
however. While law is the rare field in which it is acceptable to answer
a normative argument with a descriptive one, there is also a strong
normative case to be made against the emerging sovereignty narrative in
horizontal federalism, an argument that squarely addresses the key
intuition that animates that narrative. It takes a theory to beat a theory,
after all.
If you want to write a new storyline for horizontal federalism, then,
you must come to grips with the powerful intuitions that undergird its
competitor. You have to show that living under someone else's law
isn't a painful reality that we must tolerate if we want an integrated
democracy. It is instead an essential feature of a well-functioning
democracy. Spillovers, in other words, are a symptom of-and
62. Cf Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1051, 1105-08
(2010).
63. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: TtE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 8 (2010).
64. Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in 'Superprecedent'?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/3Orosen.html? r-O.
65. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, at 103.
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contributor to-a healthy democracy. At least, that's what I am to
convince you.
66
In making this argument, I don't mean to denigrate the value of self-
rule. The notion that we should all be able to live under our own law is
a deeply intuitive, deeply principled argument.67 But it's only half the
story. Democracy is surely about self-rule. But it's also about
interaction, accommodation, and compromise. Every community would
like to live according to its own preferences. Every person would like to
live according to his own preferences. But we quickly learn that our
preferences differ. Democracy requires us to work it out. Sometimes
we work it out directly. Sometimes we need a referee. Sometimes we
just take our lumps and live under a policy we don't like. And we do so
for a simple reason: we'd rather live with other people than without
them.
Living under someone else's law is especially important these days.
We live in the time of what Bill Bishop has called "the Big Sort.",68 Not
only are our voting patterns deeply polarized, but too many of us have
retreated into all-too comfortable red or blue enclaves, be they Fort
Worth or Portlandia. It's very useful for our worlds to collide now and
then. Those collisions give us a chance to see how other people live, to
try someone else's policy on for size. Ultimately, these collisions force
us to engage with our opponents and search for common ground.
Interstate spats spur democratic engagement, and democratic
engagement is in short supply these days.
These are all pretty atmospheric claims, so let me get more concrete
about the kinds of interactions that spillovers foster in order to convince
you that living under someone else's law can be a democratic good unto
itself. Here I'll move top-down-from the national stage to the local
one-to give you a sampling of the sort of democratic engagement that
spillovers can catalyze.
Our national politics, of course, are so locked up by polarization that
members of Congress prefer naming post offices to passing laws.6 9 It is
all too easy for Congress to leave the hard democratic decisions to states
66. This section adapts arguments sketched out in Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9, and
Gerken & Dawson, supra note 61.
67. The idea is so intuitive that some scholars merely refer to it in shorthand, see, e.g., Snyder,
supra note 59, at 432 (terming interstate spillovers a "problem [that] reflects a lack of representation"),
or describe it as a bedrock principle of horizontal federalism, e.g., Florey, supra note 59, at 1115.
68. BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING
Us APART (2009). Bishop was talking about a far more granular form of sorting than we do here, but
we nonetheless think the general point holds.
69. Jeremy W. Peters, One Area In Which Congress Excels: Naming Post Offices, N.Y. TIMES:
THE CAUCUS (May 28, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/one-area-in-
which-congress-excels-naming-post-offices/.
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and localities, where policymaking is easier because less compromise is
required. Federalism licenses national politicians to take the easy way
out. In the past, it was too easy for Congress to let states in the Jim
Crow South resolve questions of racial equality for themselves. Now
it's too easy for Congress to let states navigate the hard questions raised
by gun rights, gay rights, and abortion.
It's perfectly fine to decide to devolve authority, of course. But red
and blue silos are not the products of a well-functioning national
democracy. Democracy doesn't require rigid uniformity, but it does
require hashing things out. We should at least deliberate about which
departures from the national policy are consistent with our norms and
which are outside the bounds.70  Nowadays, however, we aren't
deliberating; we're punting. States and localities are not pursuing
different paths because we've decided that, all things considered, these
are worthy paths to pursue. They are doing so because we can't even
manage a conversation about national norms in the first place, let alone
make a collective decision about when and how they should matter.
Spillovers are one solution to this problem because they force issues
onto the national agenda. That's no mean feat these days. When one
side forces another to live under someone else's laws, the aggrieved
party almost always looks for a federal referee. When California used
its robust market power to force the rest of the country to live under its
strict environmental policies, auto executives from Detroit begged the
EPA to preempt them.7 1 When Hawaii threatened to legalize same-sex
marriage during the early stages of the marriage equality movement,
opponents sought assurances from Congress that they need not
recognize those marriages.72 Spillovers, in short, pull national elites into
the conversation even when they'd rather stay out of it. And once
national elites are drawn into the conversation, they will begin pounding
the table and pressing for change, thus drawing even more attention to
an issue.
Spillovers can also shift the political calculus in Washington. Much
of the game on the Hill involves gridlock. When the states are doing
nothing on an issue, shutting down a bill in committee or filibustering is
a no-brainer for those who favor the status quo. When a state not only
enacts a policy, but that policy spills over to other states, the calculus
70. That, indeed, is what some think liberalism is all about. See Michael Walzer, Obligations:
Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship 12 (1970) (arguing that "the historical basis of liberalism
is in large part simply a series of [ recognitions" of "the claims of smaller groups" for exemptions from
general rules).
71. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
72. For an account, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 57-60 (2013).
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changes. Blocking change in DC is no longer enough. Those who favor
the status quo suddenly have an incentive to come to the bargaining
table. Obstructionism doesn't reap the same rewards and a compromise
solution becomes more likely.
Living under someone else's law also generates democratic goods at
the state and local level. The "Big Sort" doesn't just excuse national
officials from doing the tough work of democratic compromise; it also
excuses their state and local counterparts. State legislators always know
that some of their constituents are unhappy with the enclave they've
built for their citizens, be it red or blue. But arguments for change are
usually put forward by people who lack the votes to do anything about
it, making it easy to brush their concerns aside. Politicians have few
reasons to cross party lines or compromise with dissenters.
The magic of "Our (Horizontal) Federalism" is that one jurisdiction's
dissenters are a neighboring state's majority. Those out-of-state
majorities can impose policies from the outside that the minority cannot
demand from the inside. It's easy to ignore the opposition inside your
state. But, counterintuitively, it's hard to ignore the opposition outside
the state, at least when it is has the votes to impose its views on your
unhappy constituents. Oftentimes, as previously noted, state politicians
will look to a national referee when they encounter a spillover problem.
But when a national umpire is unavailable, spillovers force state and
local officials to do what they are supposed to do: politic, find common
ground, and negotiate a compromise that no one likes but everyone can
live with. As with national officials, then, spillovers force state and
local politicians to suit up and get in the game.
Living under someone else's law matters even at the granular level:
the habits of everyday citizens. Political enclaves make things too easy
for political elites, but they also make things too easy for the rest of us.
When we sort ourselves into comfortable right-thinking (and left-
thinking) communities, the odds are that we'll ignore those with
different views. Enclaves encase us in a protective policy-making
bubble, shielded from laws with which we disagree. Opportunities for
democratic engagement are reduced. More importantly, incentives for
democratic engagement are reduced.
Spillovers enlist everyday citizens in the practices of pluralism. At
the very least, they prevent us from being oblivious. When we live
under someone else's law, we have to confront our opponents' view
directly. Progressives who decry social conservatism might actually
have to read the Texas school board's texts and think about why these
issues matter to someone else. And before Obergefell, opponents of
same-sex marriage might find themselves living next door to a same-sex
couple that was married in another state. People who insist that
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environmental regulations cost too much might find themselves driving
inexpensive cars that meet California's low-emissions standards.
Spillovers also make it easier to identify where compromise can be
found. In politics, we usually ask voters what they want rather what
they can live with. But the second question is far more important.
When we are forced to live under someone else's law, we're forced to
answer that second question. We must drive a more fuel-efficient car.
Or teach from a textbook more conservative than we'd prefer. Or live
next to someone who owns guns or smokes pot that couldn't be
purchased in-state.
These real-world experiences matter. It's easy to oppose something in
the abstract. Reality is more complicated. It is one thing, for instance,
to vote against marriage equality in the privacy of the voting booth. But
when a gay couple buys the house next door and shows up with a
casserole, that position is harder to maintain. Sometimes when we live
under someone else's law, we'll discover that the law isn't as bad as we
thought.
Sometimes engaging directly with a policy will cement our view that
it's a mistake, and that matters as well. In our highly polarized system,
it sometimes seems like we disagree about everything. Spillovers help
us sort out annoying differences that prompt little more than a collective
shrug from genuinely deep disagreements that require our collective
attention. They help us sort out the policies we'd reject in a poll and
those we'd actually work to overturn. Spillovers can thus tell us a great
deal more than polling or voting about whether a modus vivendi can be
had. And a modus vivendi is a fine thing indeed in a polarized world
like our own.
III. CONCLUSION: THE DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH A
DEMOCRATIC THEORY
I began this essay describing the relative costs and benefits of the
vastly different approaches we see in vertical and horizontal federalism.
Vertical federalism has one theory to rule them all. It asks the same
question in every federalism case-how should the states and federal
government interact?-and unsurprisingly gets the same answer in every
case. That overarching account gives shape and form to a wide range of
cases, but the one-size-fits-all approach makes it hard for courts to
calibrate its holdings. States get the same protections in areas where
they are strong and where they are weak. The Court is just as likely to
second-guess a federal-state bargain where states played a small role in
the bargaining process as those where they played an outsized role.
Moreover, the narrative is pitched at such a high level of generality that
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courts haven't noticed the facts on the ground, which means they
haven't paid enough attention to today's regulatory realities.
Horizontal federalism has proved much more adaptive. Because
judges and scholars approach the doctrine problem-by-problem and
issue-by-issue, horizontal federalism's doctrinal tool box is more
variegated and contains fewer one-way ratchets. Moreover, judges have
paid more attention to the reality of regulatory overlap and adjusted the
doctrine accordingly.
The trouble with horizontal federalism, however, is that judges have
no answer to the question that they are adjudicating in every case-how
should the states interact? We need an overarching narrative of
interstate relations, albeit not the one scholars are busily developing.
It's important, of course, to adapt principle to context. But you still
need a principle to adapt.
Based on what I said in the first half of this paper, you might wonder
whether the game is worth the candle (at least if you are a splitter by
trade). To be sure, there's a danger that developing an overarching
narrative for horizontal federalism might lead us to make the same
mistakes we've made in vertical federalism. And certainly the emerging
work in horizontal federalism compounds that worry. The scholars who
have begun to develop a sovereignty-based account of horizontal
federalism deploy the same sort of one-way ratchet we see in vertical
federalism.
While I take these concerns eriously, the sort of democratically
inflected account I've proposed should provide a looser, more flexible
narrative for the courts than a sovereignty account. Rather than begin
with the assumption that all spillovers are bad, my account would force
courts to think about the democratic costs and benefits associated with
certain spillovers.7 3 Such an account wouldn't just provide a theory for
sorting spillovers;74 it would tell judges when they should step in to stop
a spillover and when they should leave spillovers to the free play of
politics. 75  One could imagine, then, courts developing a political
safeguards account of horizontal federalism, one in which they would
harness interstate friction in the service of democratic ends while
shutting down the costly spillovers when the game isn't worth the
candle. After all, the costs of spillovers are real and important. If states
impose too many conflicting regulations on companies, the economy
suffers. If states can impose the costs of their policies or inaction on
other states, people suffer. And sometimes compromise isn't possible,
which means that spillovers can only harden our positions.
73. For an initial effort to do so, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 9.
74. Id. at 86-98
75. For an initial take on this question, see id. at 113-19.
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All of this brings me back to the key claim in this essay-the one idea
I hope you'll have in the back of your mind when you set this essay
down. I haven't suggested that spillovers are an unmitigated good. But
we sometimes forget that there are benefits to the friction that interstate
conflict generates. When we are forced to live under someone else's
law, we learn to accommodate one another's preferences, to identify
second-best solutions, and to engage in the practice of pluralism. It's
not easy, and it's certainly not fum. But these democratic benefits should
matter when we tote up the costs and benefits of spillovers.
The reasons that he debate has been so one-sided thus far is that the
arguments against spillovers-rooted as they are in the principle of self-
rule-are so intuitive. At first glance, living under someone else's law
sounds like an unmitigated problem. But it's worth remembering that
while our democratic commitments may begin with self-rule, they
should not end with it. Democratic self-rule is often played as a trump
card, but it isn't. Democracy requires us to do just what spillovers
prompt us to do: Work it out. And working it out is the most
important-and challenging-thing we can do in this polarized age. As
I noted early in this essay, everyone would like to live according to his
own preferences. But we quickly learn that our preferences differ.
Democracy requires us to work it out. And we do so for a simple
reason, a lesson that only misanthropes and academics resist-we'd
rather live with other people than without them.
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